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npm

CVE-2026-84363

Hono: Query parser reads parameters after the URL fragment, causing cache-key and proxy interpretation differentials

Severity
Medium 5.9
Published
8 Sept 2026
Last changed
8 Sept 2026
Added to UpHeron
22 Oct 2026
Fixed in
4.13.5
Exploit chance
0.4% in the next 30 daysHigher than 39% of CVEs. EPSS by FIRST, 19 Nov 2026
Weakness
HTTP request smuggling (CWE-444)
Attack
Over the network · Only under certain conditions · No login needed · No user action needed
Attacker can
Change data
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Also known as
GHSA-crvj-82cr-hjcx
Sources
OSV.dev and GitHub

Description

Hono's query parsing does not stop at the URL fragment: a ? appearing after a # is treated as the start of a query string. As a result, the application can read request parameters that no other component involved in handling the request can see.

A fragment is never part of the query, and every standard URL consumer — browsers, new URL(), reverse proxies — ignores everything from the first # onward. Hono's routing followed that rule; its query helpers did not.

For one and the same request, this produces an interpretation differential:

  • A component in front of the application that inspects the query string — filtering rules, parameter allow/deny lists, access logging — observes no parameters, while the application reads and acts on them.
  • The cache middleware removed the fragment when building its cache key, so a response influenced by parameters carried inside the fragment could be stored under a key that did not reflect them and later returned to other users.
From the GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0. Shortened; the full text is there.

Affected software

SoftwareAffected versions
hononpm · osv:npm:hono
  • Every version before 4.13.5

About hono

Weekly downloads (npm)
108,805,821npm, 16 Nov 2026

References