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npm

CVE-2026-71850

Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure

Severity
Medium 4.8
Published
7 Aug 2026
Last changed
10 Sept 2026
Added to UpHeron
22 Oct 2026
Fixed in
4.12.34
Exploit chance
0.3% in the next 30 daysHigher than 19% of CVEs. EPSS by FIRST, 19 Nov 2026
Weakness
CWE-488
Attack
Over the network · Only under certain conditions · Needs a user account · Needs someone to click or open something
Attacker can
Read data
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Also known as
GHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r
Sources
OSV.dev and GitHub

Description

memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server-side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator-equal props. Request-scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request.

Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone. Values read implicitly during rendering do not participate: JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage. The retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it.

Per-request context isolation is not what fails: the current request's values are established correctly, but the memoized component is skipped before anything reads them.

This issue arises when a component wrapped in memo() obtains user- or request-specific data from an ambient context instead of through props.

From the GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0. Shortened; the full text is there.

Affected software

SoftwareAffected versions
hononpm · osv:npm:hono
  • From 3.8.0 before 4.12.34

About hono

Weekly downloads (npm)
108,805,821npm, 16 Nov 2026

References