All vulnerabilities

Servers and applications

GHSA-945r-hp2m-928m

OS Command Injection via filePath in mount.deleteFileMount → HOST RCE

Severity
Critical 9.9
Published
12 Nov 2026
Last changed
12 Nov 2026
Added to UpHeron
12 Nov 2026
Fixed in
0.31.1
Weakness
Command injection (CWE-77)OS command injection (CWE-78)
Attack
Over the network · Needs a user account · No user action needed
Attacker can
Read data · Change data · Take it down
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Sources
Project advisories (GitHub)

Description

Deleting a file mount runs rm -rf where the path is built by interpolating the mount's user-controlled filePath unquoted into a shell command executed by execAsync. filePath is stored with no shell-safe validation (z.string().optional()), so an authenticated user who can create and delete a mount on a service they own obtains arbitrary command execution in the Docker-privileged host context → root on the node.

Unlike the DB changePassword family, this sink has no running-container precondition the command runs as soon as the mount is deleted which makes it the easiest to trigger.

packages/server/src/services/mount.ts:280-295 deleteFileMount:

packages/server/src/utils/filesystem/directory.ts:38-45 removeFileOrDirectory:

The remote branch (and the sibling updateFileMount, which uses … > ${quote([fullPath])} ) correctly wrap the value with shell-quote's quote(). The local branch the default single-node install driving its own host passes fullPath straight into rm -rf ${path}.

From Dokploy/dokploy's security advisory. Shortened; the full text is there.

Affected software

SoftwareAffected versions
DokployServers and applications · github:dokploy/dokploy
  • Every version before 0.31.1

References