GHSA-66r5-5m5f-57vg

The Git-provider tRPC routers (github.ts, gitlab.ts, bitbucket.ts, gitea.ts) each expose a one query (and getRepositories/getBranches/testConnection) that loads a provider by a bare ID through protectedProcedure, which performs authentication ONLY and does NOT enforce organization scoping. The handler returns the full provider row including secrets: GitHub App private key, client secret, webhook secret; GitLab/Gitea OAuth secret + access/refresh tokens; Bitbucket API token.

Any authenticated user — including one who self-registers and creates their own organization (organization.create is protectedProcedure, available to every authenticated user, making the caller an owner) — can pass another organization's provider ID and read that organization's Git-provider credentials. This crosses the tenant trust boundary and yields the secrets needed to clone/modify the victim org's source repositories (e.g. minting GitHub App installation tokens from the leaked private key).