Servers and applications
GHSA-3gwm-5wx8-4gm6
Unauthenticated account takeover via OTP-Email and OTP-SMS return-code bypass in Login V2
- Severity
- High 8.1
- Published
- 14 Aug 2026
- Last changed
- 14 Aug 2026
- Added to UpHeron
- 3 Nov 2026
- Fixed in
- 4.17.1
- Weakness
- Information exposure (CWE-200)Improper authentication (CWE-287)Missing authentication (CWE-306)
- Attack
- Over the network · Only under certain conditions · No login needed · No user action needed
- Attacker can
- Read data · Change data · Take it down
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H- Sources
- Project advisories (GitHub)
Description
ZITADEL’s hosted Login V2 UI allowed an unauthenticated attacker who knows only a victim’s login name to obtain a fully MFA-authenticated session for that victim — without any password, passkey, or IdP login — provided the victim already had both OTP-Email and OTP-SMS second factors enrolled. After the login name is submitted (an identify-only session, before any primary factor is verified), Login V2’s server action forwarded attacker-controlled challenge requests to the backend using the returnCode delivery type, which returns the generated OTP codes directly in the HTTP response instead of sending them to the victim’s mailbox or phone. Submitting both codes produced a session that ZITADEL treated as MFA-authenticated, because two second factors were counted as satisfying MFA.
An attacker who knows a valid login name — where the target already has OTP-Email and OTP-SMS enrolled and ready — can take over that account without knowing the password, using an existing authenticator, or…
Workarounds
The recommended solution is to upgrade to a patched version; there is no configuration that fully closes this gap on unpatched versions. To reduce exposure in the meantime, avoid having both OTP-Email and OTP-SMS enrolled on the same account — especially for privileged (e.g. IAM_OWNER) users — and prefer TOTP, U2F/security keys, or passkeys as second factors. The attack is only possible against accounts that hold both OTP-Email and OTP-SMS.
Affected software
| Software | Affected versions |
|---|---|
ZITADELServers and applications · github:zitadel/zitadel |
|
About ZITADEL
ZITADEL - Identity infrastructure, simplified for you.
- GitHub stars
- 15,585GitHub, 15 Nov 2026
- Forks
- 1,432GitHub, 15 Nov 2026
- Latest release
- v4.20.3GitHub, 15 Nov 2026
- Released
- 13 Nov 2026GitHub
- License
- AGPL-3.0GitHub
- First published on GitHub
- 16 Mar 2020GitHub
Vulnerabilities in ZITADEL
- In our list
- 103
- Published in the last 12 months
- 72
- Critical, last 12 months
- 13
- High, last 12 months
- 37
- Known exploited
- 0
- GHSA-qqv8-37gw-ww2qMissing second-factor check on authenticator enrollment in Login V2 (MFA bypass)High 8.1 18 Nov 2026
- GHSA-vg5j-vf6h-586mLogin V2 exposes internal functions as unauthenticated endpointsHigh 7.4 13 Nov 2026
- GHSA-3gwf-ph53-v73cLogin V2: authentication bypass via unauthenticated (zero-factor) session for OIDC and SAML requestsHigh 7.4 13 Nov 2026
- GHSA-gx82-3gqq-j4h5Session API and Login V2: organization login policy not enforced for password sign-inHigh 7.1 13 Nov 2026
- GHSA-fphg-99ff-7qrpLogin V2: external IdP sign-in callback not bound to the initiating browser (login CSRF / session swapping)Medium 5.4 13 Nov 2026
- GHSA-pm3x-9hh8-g745Login V2: Arbitrary Redirect URL AcceptedMedium 4.3 13 Nov 2026
References
- GitHub Advisory Database https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3gwm-5wx8-4gm6
- github.com https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/security/advisories/GHSA-3gwm-5wx8-4gm6