All vulnerabilities

Servers and applications

GHSA-3gwm-5wx8-4gm6

Unauthenticated account takeover via OTP-Email and OTP-SMS return-code bypass in Login V2

Severity
High 8.1
Published
14 Aug 2026
Last changed
14 Aug 2026
Added to UpHeron
3 Nov 2026
Fixed in
4.17.1
Weakness
Information exposure (CWE-200)Improper authentication (CWE-287)Missing authentication (CWE-306)
Attack
Over the network · Only under certain conditions · No login needed · No user action needed
Attacker can
Read data · Change data · Take it down
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Sources
Project advisories (GitHub)

Description

ZITADEL’s hosted Login V2 UI allowed an unauthenticated attacker who knows only a victim’s login name to obtain a fully MFA-authenticated session for that victim — without any password, passkey, or IdP login — provided the victim already had both OTP-Email and OTP-SMS second factors enrolled. After the login name is submitted (an identify-only session, before any primary factor is verified), Login V2’s server action forwarded attacker-controlled challenge requests to the backend using the returnCode delivery type, which returns the generated OTP codes directly in the HTTP response instead of sending them to the victim’s mailbox or phone. Submitting both codes produced a session that ZITADEL treated as MFA-authenticated, because two second factors were counted as satisfying MFA.

An attacker who knows a valid login name — where the target already has OTP-Email and OTP-SMS enrolled and ready — can take over that account without knowing the password, using an existing authenticator, or…

From zitadel/zitadel's security advisory. Shortened; the full text is there.

Workarounds

The recommended solution is to upgrade to a patched version; there is no configuration that fully closes this gap on unpatched versions. To reduce exposure in the meantime, avoid having both OTP-Email and OTP-SMS enrolled on the same account — especially for privileged (e.g. IAM_OWNER) users — and prefer TOTP, U2F/security keys, or passkeys as second factors. The attack is only possible against accounts that hold both OTP-Email and OTP-SMS.

Workarounds as given by zitadel/zitadel's security advisory.

Affected software

SoftwareAffected versions
ZITADELServers and applications · github:zitadel/zitadel
  • From 4.0.0 before 4.17.1

About ZITADEL

ZITADEL - Identity infrastructure, simplified for you.

From its GitHub repository.
GitHub stars
15,585GitHub, 15 Nov 2026
Forks
1,432GitHub, 15 Nov 2026
Latest release
v4.20.3GitHub, 15 Nov 2026
Released
13 Nov 2026GitHub
License
AGPL-3.0GitHub
First published on GitHub
16 Mar 2020GitHub

References